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FRAUDULENT TELEMARKETING
Introduction
Fraudulent telemarketing is an insidious modem problem. It
takes many forms and is widespread, difficult to detect, and vastly un-
derreported. Fraudulent telemarketers prey on all consumers, even
well-informed, cautious ones; senior citizens are especially hard-hit.
Consumers, lending institutions, credit card companies, and legitimate
businesses lose millions of dollars each year to telephone fraud. Cur-
rent methods of fighting this type of fraud include actions by the Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC) and civil and criminal actions under the
Racketeering and Corrupt Organizations Act1 (RICO) and state laws.
These enforcement mechanisms are clearly insufficient, however, be-
cause millions of consumers continue to be victimized each year. This
Note outlines the evolution of telemarketing fraud, discusses the limi-
tations of current enforcement mechanisms, and proposes realistic so-
lutions to the problem.
I
Background: The Evolution of Telemarketing Fraud
A. History of Telemarketing
Most telemarketing is a legitimate,2 albeit irritating3 business
practice.4 Marketing and selling products by telephone began during
the 1930s and 1940s as a response to the decreased labor force during
World War II, 5 and began to flourish when the oil crisis of the early
1970s made door-to-door sales travel impractical and expensive.6
During the last decade the business of telephone sales has expanded
dramatically, due in part to an increase in public confidence in
purchasing goods by phone.7 Items ranging from magazine and news-
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
2. Telemarketing Fraud: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1992)
[hereinafter 1992 Senate Hearing].
3. Bob Bulmash, founder of Private Citizen Inc., a coalition of citizens opposed to
incoming telemarketing, is quoted as saying, "Telemarketing is derived from Greek ...
'tele' meaning distant or far off, 'marketing' meaning to disrupt dinner." David Arnold,
Hated or Not, Telemarketers Are the Sellers of Choice, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 20, 1994, Metro
Section, at 1.
4. Teresa Riordan, Dread Ringers, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 1992, Magazine Section, at
W12.
5. See Consuelo L. Kertz & Lisa B. Burnette, Telemarketing Tug-of-War: Balancing
Telephone Information Technology and the First Amendment with Consumer Protection
and Privacy, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1029, 1042 (1992).
6. Riordan, supra note 4, at W12.
7. Id.
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paper subscriptions' to cemetery plots9 and securities' ° are sold by
telephone at a fraction of the cost of marketing via direct mail or in
person." Communications technology developed during the 1980s' 2
allows telemarketers to make as many as 7400 calls per hour,'3 helping
telemarketing to flourish into a five hundred billion dollar per year
business' 4 that employs as many as four million people. 15 By the turn
of the century, telemarketing revenues are estimated to reach one tril-
lion dollars.'6
B. Telemarketing Fraud
Telephone swindles are almost as old as the telephone itself. As
early as the 1920s, con artists ,operated telephone scams from base-
ment boiler room hideaways. 7 The boom in the telemarketing indus-
try during the 1980s' 8 brought an increase in the crime associated with
it.' 9 The anonymity of the telephone, combined with the ease of es-
caping detection, makes telemarketing fraud a lucrative and profitable
business for scam artists 20 who con consumers out of an estimated fif-




11. Arnold, supra note 3, at 1. In 1991 telemarketing industry revenues were $435
billion; costs totalled only $60 billion. Riordan, supra note 4, at W12.
12. Riordan, supra note 4, at W12. Most telemarketing calls are dialed automatically
by computerized machines known as predictive dialers. A customer list or database is
entered into the computer, which then dials the numbers automatically. The machine is
able to detect busy signals, and will disconnect if the call goes unanswered after a certain
number of rings. The call is put through to a telemarketer only if a human voice is de-
tected at the other end. Id. at W14.
13. Id.
14. Arnold, supra note 3, at 1.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Telefraud: They've Got Your Number, CONSUMER REP., May 1987, at 289 [herein-
after Telefraud].
18. See Riordan, supra note 4, at W12.
19. See Arnold, supra note 3, at 1.
20. 1992 Senate Hearing, supra note 2, at 2-3.
21. Michael Chapman, Telemarketing Fraud: A Network of Lies, CONSUMERS' RES.
MAO., Apr. 1993, at 10; Riordan, supra note 4, at W12. See also 1992 Senate Hearing, supra
note 2, at 3 (FVC estimates telemarketing fraud at $40 billion per year); Terri Shaw, Dial-
ing for Your Dollars: Calls from Strangers Could Be Fraud-or Just a Terrible Nuisance,
WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 1991, at "19 (estimating losses at $15 billion per year). These esti-
mates are up from the FrC's estimate of $1. billion in losses in 1988. Telemarketing Fraud:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Consumer of the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 Senate
Hearing].
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1. Anatomy of a Telemarketing Scam
A typical telemarketing scam may be described as follows. A tel-
ephone con artist known as a "yak ' 22 sets up shop in a temporary
office known as a "boiler room. ' 23 The yak purchases telephone ser-
vice and a mailbox, 24 and sets to work selling worthless goods,25 use-
less services, or bogus investment opportunities. 26 Before the victims
discover the fraud, the yak unplugs the telephones and moves to an-
other location to begin a new scam.27
a. The Boiler Room
Fraudulent telemarketing operations are often referred to as
"boiler room" scams.2 The term takes its name from the earliest tele-
phone-sales scams of the 1920s that literally operated out of basement
boiler rooms in order to avoid detection.29 Modern boiler rooms are
often shabby, temporary offices in low rent areas,30 equipped with lit-
tle more than a bank of telephones. 31 Telephone swindlers do not
need fancy office space because all of their deception is done over the
telephone.32 If an operation senses that it is about to be detected, it
need only disconnect the telephone service and move to another of-
fice, either down the street or out of the state.
33
During the past several years, certain areas of the country have
gained and lost popularity as boiler room locales. While the warm
climates of Florida and Southern California were once attractive, 3
these states have managed to curtail telemarketing fraud through
strict regulation. 35 Las Vegas and other Nevada locations were fa-
22. Telefraud, supra note 17, at 289, 290.
23. See id. at 289, 291.
24. Id.; see Elaine Tassy, Laguna Beach Man Arrested in Telemarketing Scheme, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 6, 1994, at B4.
25. David R. Spiegel, Crime in the Suites: Why Christmas Shoppers Should Beware,
WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 1992, at C3.
26. Telefraud, supra note 17, at 289.
27. Id. at 289, 290.
28. Id. at 289.
29. Id.
30. Spiegel, supra note 25.
31. Telefraud, supra note 17, at 289; 1992 Senate Hearing, supra note 2, at 6.
32. See Riordan, supra note 4, at W12.
33. See 1992 Senate Hearing, supra note 2, at 6.
34. Telefiaud, supra note 17, at 292.
35. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17511 et seq. (West 1988) (added by 1985 Cal.
Stat. ch. 1009, § 1) (discussed infra at notes 276-89 and accompanying text); Communica-
tions Fraud Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 817 (1987) (discussed infra at notes 290-96 and ac-
companying text).
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vored as boiler room locations during the 1980s;36 however, in 1989
Nevada enacted creative legislation to address the problem.37
Unfortunately, state laws do not eliminate boiler rooms; they
merely force the operators to become more creative. The largest and
most successful are migratory, moving from one state to another
within a matter of weeks.38 The National Consumers League recently
tracked the movements of one fraudulent prize operation39 from
Phoenix, to Houston, then back to Phoenix.4' The company would
operate for two to three weeks in one city, then resurface weeks later
in another.4 '
To escape jurisdiction, most operations direct their efforts to vic-
tims located outside of the state where the boiler room is located.42
Others use telephone lines in one state and shipping services in an-
other43 to contact victims located in still other states.4 Boiler rooms
rely on express package services,45 toll-free telephone numbers,46 ille-
gal factoring,47 and even attorneys and certified public accountants
(CPAs) to support their schemes.48
b. The Yak
The voices behind telemarketing scams belong to clever swindlers
known as "yaks. ' '49 These con artists are skilled salespeople-persua-
sive and persistent.5 0 Instead of selling legitimate products or serv-
ices, however, yaks induce victims to pay for goods that will never be
shipped 5' or that are worth far less than the yaks claim, 2 or to "in-
36. 1992 Senate Hearing, supra note 2, at 2.
37. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 599B.010-1300. (Michie Supp. 1994) (discussed infra at
notes 297-305 and accompanying text). See 1992 Senate Hearing, supra note 2, at 2.
38. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Transportation and Hazardous Materials of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1993) [hereinafter 1993
House Hearing].
39. For discussion of prize scams, see infra text accompanying notes 85-110.
40. 1993 House Hearing, supra note 38, at 33 (statement of John F. Barker, Vice-Presi-
dent, National Consumers League).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 35.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See infra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.
46. 1993 House Hearing, supra note 38, at 35.
47. Id. at 15 (statement of Barry Cutler, Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection,
Federal Trade Commission). See infra notes 170-73 and accompanying text for explanation
of factoring.
48. See Chapman, supra note 21, at 11, 13.
49. See id. at 10.
50. See id. at 10-11.
51. See id.
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vest" in nonexistent securities or stocks.53 To contact consumers, they
dial telephone numbers obtained from various sources, including mail-
ing lists and advertisements,54 or even at random.5 Yaks may identify
likely victims by using "sucker lists"-lists of individuals who have
previously fallen for similar scams 56-that are traded among con oper-
ators.57 A proven sucker's name may sell for hundreds of dollars.
58
Once a yak has a would-be victim's interest, he begins his pitch,
using a variety of tactics to wear down the victim's defenses. The per-
petrator of a "prize" scam,59 for example, will eagerly "congratulate"
a person for having won a valuable prize, and will then pressure the
consumer to send money or disclose a credit card number to cover
"shipping charges '60 or to purchase lower priced goods in order to
"qualify '61 for the prize. Even a cautious listener may be over-
whelmed by the seller's aggressiveness and enthusiasm.
This type of urgency is a common theme in sales pitches. Fraudu-
lent sellers require their victims to commit immediately, without a
chance to compare prices or think about the purchase. If a consumer
hesitates, the pressure increases. 2 Con artists depend upon victims
who act impulsively, before they realize that they are being conned.
A yak who purports to sell an investment opportunity, for example,
might convince the consumer that only a few shares remain, or that
the market is rising rapidly.63 In United States v. Judd,' an operation
uncovered in Mississippi involved a land sale scheme that spurred vic-
tims to buy land by falsifying the number of lots sold and the number
52. See Around the Nation-Phone Sales Crackdown, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1993, at
A9.
53. Chapman, supra note 21, at 10.
54. Telefraud, supra note 17, at 289.
55. Boiler room operations may also purchase "qualified" leads-names of people
who have shown an interest when contacted-from lead-finding companies. Telefraud,
supra note 17, at 289.
56. Spiegel, supra note 25; Charles M. Sennott, Sweepstakes Alert: Play it Again
Scam?, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 3, 1994, at Al, A8.
57. Sennott, supra note 56, at A8.
58. Telefraud, supra note 17, at 289.
59. See infra notes 85-110 and accompanying text.
60. Beware of Postcard Telemarketing Scams, CONSUMERS' RES. MAG., Jan. 1992, at 22
[hereinafter Beware].
61. Id.
62. See Telefraud, supra note 17, at 290.
63. See id.
64. United States v. Judd, 889 F.2d 1410 (5th Cir. 1989). Judd and his accomplices
telemarketed land that was falsely guaranteed to contain coal deposits. The fraudulent
operation owned the land it was selling, but it did not own the mineral rights to the coal.
When the scheme was uncovered, fifteen individuals were indicted on 154 counts of fraud.
Id. at 1411-12 n.1.
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remaining available.65 The information would be recorded in the vic-
tim's file so that each yak who spoke to the victim would give the
same false information.66
Yaks are especially adept at diffusing consumer skepticism, as in
the following excerpt from an actual telemarketer's script. This is a
typical response to a customer reluctant to give his or her credit card
number over the telephone:
[W]e contact MC/VISA to varify [sic] your credit .... If we mis-
used any credit card number, not only would we lose that merchant
number but no doubt, our bank would freeze our account for a com-
plete audit of all business on MC/VISA.6 7
To an unsophisticated consumer eager to make a bargain purchase,
this cryptic assurance might be convincing.
Sophisticated swindlers will even refer consumers to the "man-
ager," actually another con artist, or to a "singer"-an accomplice
masquerading ,as a satisfied customer.68 The operators of the Judd
scheme habitually referred potential investors to singers called "bird
dogs," who were paid three hundred dollars per transaction to pose as
"previously satisfied investors. '69 Other yaks would sometimes pose
as "project managers" in order to close deals.7 ° There were, of course,
no real project managers. 7' Swindlers designed these referral tactics
to fool potential victims into believing that the operation was
legitimate.72
While some con artists work alone, many others are merely minor
participants in larger parent operations.73 Some may not even realize
that they are working for criminal business ventures.74 Most, how-
ever, are fully aware of the fraud and often use aliases 75 and other
false information to avoid being connected with the trails of scams
they perpetrate.76
65. Id. at 1416.
66. Id.
67. FTC v. Amy Travel Serv., Inc., 875 F.2d 564, 568 (7th Cir. 1989).
68. See id.
69. Judd, 889 F.2d at 1412.
70. Id. at 1416.
71. Id.
72. See id.
73. 1992 Senate Hearing, supra note 2, at 4-5. These larger, so-called "root" operations
may provide credit card merchant accounts, sales scripts, factoring services, and even
prizes and merchandise to smaller scam operations. Id. at 18.
74. Telefraud, supra note 17, at 291. These unwitting accomplices are nonetheless
prosecuted if the fraudulent operation is discovered. See id.
75. Chapman, supra note 21.
76. See id.; 1992 Senate Hearing, supra note 2, at 2.
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c. The Scam
Though the variations are endless, telemarketing scams usually
take one of three basic forms. In "prize" scams, victims are notified
that they have already won a valuable prize and are required to send
money, purchase merchandise, or call a 900 number to claim or qual-
ify for the prize." "Merchandise" and "travel" scams are often perpe-
trated in the guise of marketing studies or promotions.78 Consumers
are pressured to purchase travel coupons and merchandise of all
kinds, from perfume and vitamin pills to kitchen appliances 79 and ex-
ercise equipment,80 often at alleged discounts.8 Finally, "investment
scams" are often elaborate schemes whereby victims purchase invest-
ments such as -securities 2 or gold bullion; 3 of course, the only person
who realizes gains from such investments is the scam artist.
84
(i) Prize Scams
Fraudulent prize schemes aie very common.85 A 1992 Louis Har-
ris survey indicated that over ninety percent of Americans had been
solicited by a telemarketing prize scheme.86 Some prize scams lure
victims using postcards87 or advertisements, 88 while others are carried
out solely by telephone.8 9 Yaks call victims and tell them that they are
guaranteed to win one of several prizes.' A typical prize list includes
cars, vacation packages,9' large-screen televisions, cash awards, and
jewelry or electronics equipment.92 All of the prizes sound valuable,
77. See 1993 House Hearing, supra note 38, at 20.
78. Chapman, supra note 21, at 10-12.
79. 1992 Senate Hearing, supra note 2, at 3.
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., FTC v. Amy Travel Serv., Inc., 875 F.2d 564, 567-68 (7th Cir. 1989)
(telemarketing operators told victims that they were test marketing a very limited amount
of their "special" low priced vacation packages, when in reality there was no limit to the
number of packages available).
82. See Telefraud, supra note 17, at 291-92.
83. See id.
84. See Chapman, supra note 21, at 11. See also Penny Stock Market Fraud: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 102-22 (1989) (testimony of Lorenzo Formato, con-
victed former broker and participant in the federal witness protection program) [hereinaf-
ter 1989 House Hearing].
85. 1993 House Hearing, supra note 38, at 17.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Telefraud, supra note 17, at 289.
89. Phone Sales Crackdown, supra note'52, at A9.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See 1988 Senate Hearing, supra note 21, at 58.
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but one of the choices-usually the jewelry or electronics equip-
ment-is nearly worthless.93 Victims are then informed that receipt of
the prize is conditional-they must pay money or buy merchandise in
order to claim the award.94
The varieties of conditions are endless. For example, victims may
be required to pay a service fee, sales tax, or a shipping charge in
order to receive the prize.95 Such charges may range from ten or
twenty dollars to thousands of dollars.96 The victim pays the charge,
thinking that the in cash outlay will be compensated by the value of
the prize.97 The amount received from each victim may be small, but
the sheer volume of victims makes the prize scam extremely profitable
for con artists.98
In another scenario, consumers may be informed that they need
only make a small purchase in order to qualify for the prize. The con-
sumer then pays from ten to over four thousand dollars99 for merchan-
dise such as pens, gold-plated letter openers, 1°° skin care products,
and vitamin pills.' 0 ' Popular qualifier merchandise includes items
whose values are difficult to ascertain, such as vitamin and weight-loss
supplements, cosmetics, and perfume.10 2 A product made from cheap
ingredients can easily sound more valuable than it is, 10 3 and often the
consumer is not interested in the qualifier merchandise anyway.' °4 To
the victim, the payoff seems reasonable: pay a small amount for un-
wanted goods or services but receive a valuable prize.1°5
Frequently, both the prizes and the qualifier merchandise are vir-
tually worthless. Some victims never receive prizes.'0 6 If they do, the
prize received is invariably the smallest of the listed awards. 1°7 Usu-
93. Anne Gowen, One Woman's Fight Against Phone Rip-Offs, GOOD HOUSEKEEP-
ING, Nov. 1993, at 189.
94. See, e.g., Sennott, supra note 56, at A8.
95. Beware, supra note 60, at 22.
96. Id. See Sennott, supra note 56, at A8.
97. Sennott, supra note 56, at A8.
98. 1993 House Hearing, supra note 38, at 21.
99. Id.; see Sennott, supra note 56, at A8.
100. Sennott, supra note 56, at A8.
101. Phone Sales Crackdown, supra note 52, at A9.
102. Gowen, supra note 93, at 127; Phone Sales Crackdown, supra note 52, at A9; see
also 1992 Senate Hearing, supra note 2, at 6.
103. Kathleen Pender, How Scam Artists Entice Travelers with Phony Vacations, S.F.
CHRON., Jan. 17, 1994, at B1; Phone Sales Crackdown, supra note 52, at A9; see also
Gowen, supra note 93, at 189.
104. See Gowen, supra note 93, at 189.
105. See Sennott, supra note 56, at A8- Phone Sales Crackdown, supra note 52, at A9;
1992 Senate Hearing, supra note 2, at 6.
106. Beware, supra note 60, at 22-23.
107. Sennott, supra note 56, at A8.
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ally, by the time the victims discover the fraud, the con artist has relo-
cated.'0 8 Not surprisingly, the Harris Survey' 0 9 revealed that sixty-
nine percent of respondents who participated in a prize scheme re-
ceived nothing for their money.110
(ii) Merchandise Scams and Travel Scams
Merchandise scams and travel scams are similar in many ways to
prize scams. In such schemes, yaks often resort to creative role-play-
ing to lure their victims into paying far more for vacations and travel
club memberships than those trips or services are worth."' Consum-
ers are frequently overwhelmed by yaks' enthusiastic and persistent
sales pitches. Guarantees are freely offered," 2 but the yaks have no
intention of honoring them."
3
Common merchandise scams involve low quality electronics
equipment such as cameras, radios, and similar items with a high
claimed value." 4 Such items are inexpensive for con artists to pro-
duce or purchase and can be sold at highly inflated prices.115 A victim
attempting to return such merchandise pursuant to a guarantee may
be stonewalled, ignored, or may find that the fraudulent operation has
disappeared." 6
108. 1992 Senate Hearing, supra note 2, at 10.
109. See 1993 House Hearing, supra note 38, at 17.
110. Beware, supra note 60, at 22.
111. The following is a script developed by a fraudulent telemarketing operation in
Illinois:
Hi, my name is _ with T.C. & T. of Houston, Texas. How are you today?
Great!!!! Mr./Mrs./Ms. .. The reason I am calling, is you have been com-
puter selected to be offered a special, vacation voucher to Hawaii for only
$329.90! This is being offered to less than 1% of all the credit card holders in the
U.S.
At that price, I'm sure you'd like to go, however, I do have to ask some qualifying
?s first ....
(regardless of [the consumer's] questions, the answer is:)
First, Mr./Mrs.Ms. -, let's see if you qualify ....
I'm glad you said (yes) to those qualifications .... Now I can tell you what we can
do for you, and why we can offer you this wonderful vacation package at such a
low price.
We have tested the feasibility of telephone marketing, and the results have been
so great that we have been allowed to continue to offer this special vacation pack-
age to preferred people like you.
FTC v. Amy Travel Serv., Inc., 875 F.2d 564, 567 n.2 (7th Cir. 1989). The operation was
later held liable for violating the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq. Id.
at 570.
112. See id.
113. 1988 Senate Hearing, supra note 21, at 58.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See, eg., Gowen, supra note 93, at 189.
1994]
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Even more popular than merchandise scams are those involving
travel and other services such as credit repair, club memberships, and
employment referrals.'17 The National Consumer's League estimates
that one out of every seven cases of fraud involves travel. 118 Most
likely, this is because the value of travel, unlike most goods, cash, or
cars, is easy to overstate.119 Con artists are able to take advantage of
consumers' uncertainties about the price of these services by persuad-
ing them that the offer is only good for the duration of the telephone
call, thereby precluding price comparisons. 20 Moreover, the delay
between the time the victims purchase the travel service (usually in
the form of a voucher or coupon) and the time the trip is arranged
gives the yaks a longer window of opportunity before the fraud is
detected.' 2'
A typical travel scam operates as follows. Yaks phone consumers
and gain their interest in a discount vacation package. The yak ex-
plains that the offer is open for a limited amount of time, so the con-
sumer must act immediately or miss the opportunity for the
discount. 22 The offer usually includes low priced airfare or accommo-
dations, but requires customers to book their travel through a particu-
lar travel agency-the boiler room. 23  The typical scam offers
apparent bargain prices, but when the customer finally books the trip,
prices for the other elements of the vacation are so inflated that the
trip costs more than it would have without the "bargain" certificate.
124
In other situations, boiler room operators make booking travel
very inconvenient, either through black-out dates, location require-
ments, or other hurdles. Passport Internationale, a Florida
telemarketing operation later targeted by the FTC,125 used such a
scheme to defraud consumers. Passport required customers who had
already purchased travel coupons to submit their desired travel dates
sixty days in advance, and to submit three preferred dates that were at
least thirty days apart. 26 Most customers purchased costly upgrades
117. 1993 House Hearing, supra note 38, at 44-45; Echo Montgomery Garrett, You
Have Won!, MONEY, Oct. 1993, at 180; Phone Sales Crackdown, supra note 52.




121. 1988 Senate Hearing, supra note 21, at 58.
122. Telefraud, supra note 17, at 290.
123. See id.
124. Id.
125. 1993 House Hearing, supra note 38, at 15.
126. Id.; see Pender, supra note 103, at B1.
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in order to obtain reasonable travel dates.'27 Other times, the cou-
pons simply expired before the frustrated customers could book the
trip.' 28 Instead of realizing they have been defrauded, many victims of
travel scams believe that they simply procrastinated too long.
Travel and merchandise frauds often deceive consumers by mas-
querading as marketing research or promotion events. A variety of
claims are advanced to explain the telephone sale, each designed to
confuse and pressure the consumer into making an immediate
purchase without shopping around. 29 For example, a yak may tell the
consumer that the merchandise-be it a vacation package, a weight-
loss plan, or a water purifier13°-is being test marketed, hence the ap-
parent bargain prices. 3'
(iii) Investment Scams
By far the most innovative and dangerous of fraudulent
telemarketing schemes are investment scams. While prize, merchan-
dise and travel scams are avoided relatively easily by cautious, in-
formed consumers, 132 investment scams are often elaborate enough to
fool even cautious investors. 133 Fraudulent investment scams may
lead consumers on for months or years, beginning with a small invest-
ment and eventually luring unsuspecting victims to invest tens and
even hundreds of thousands of dollars.' 34 The FTC estimates invest-
ment fraud from telemarketing at eleven billion dollars per year.
35
Boiler room operations take elaborate steps to make their busi-
nesses look legitimate. 36 Two former telemarketing con artists testi-
fied before the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer, and
127. 1993 House Hearing, supra note 38, at 18.
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., FFC v. Amy Travel Serv., Inc., 875 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1989) (discussed
supra at note 111).
130. Water purifier frauds were such a popular scam item that California enacted a
statute making it unlawful to misrepresent the presence of contaminants in water or the
performance of a water treatment device. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17577.2 to .5 (West
1993).
131. See, e.g., Amy Travel, discussed supra at notes 111-12.
132. See Gowen, supra note 93. It may seem that there is a fine line between perpetrat-
ing a fraud and merely using. aggressive sales tactics to take advantage of overly eager
consumers. The line drawn by courts, however, is whether the sellers knew or should have
known that they were misrepresenting their products or services to consumers. Amy
Travel, 875 F.2d at 574. The consumer's gullibility is not a defense. Id.
133. Chapman, supra note 21, at 12.
134. Telefraud, supra note 17, at 289-92.
135. 1993 House Hearing, supra note 38, at 33.
136. See Chapman, supra note 21, at 10-12.
19941 FRAUDULENT TELEMARKETFINO
Monetary Affairs about a typical scenario."' Telemarketing opera-
tions buy "aged' 1 38 corporations off the shelf' 39 from attorneys who
will then verify the corporations' legitimacy. 40 Operators join the
Better Business Bureau of the Chamber of Commerce, and they hire
attorneys and CPAs to create the appearance of a legitimate busi-
ness.14 The telemarketers can then assure consumers that they have
been incorporated for a number of years, and that no complaints have
been lodged against them.142 Such claims, although meaningless, are
completely verifiable by would-be investors. The telemarketers print
up glossy brochures, prospecti, and written guarantees.
43
The con artist can then choose an investment source. Recently
uncovered scams have involved gemstones (which turn out to be
worthless industrial-grade chips, encased in plastic to preclude in-
dependent appraisal), 44 shares in a fictitious commodity called "In-
dium,' 45 and "dirt mines" Where victims purchase piles of dirt
"guaranteed" to contain enough gold to recover their investments
(which turn out to be, of course, piles of dirt). 46
After a yak peddling a fraudulent investment gains a victim's in-
terest and trust, the con is tailored to the victim's wealth.147 Since
many of those defrauded are repeat victims, the yak may know a good
deal about the victim's financial status in advance.148 The yak pres-
sures the victim to make an initial investment, and then may send sta-
tus reports, telling the victim how successful the investment has been
and encouraging larger and larger investments. 49
If the consumer wishes to cash out the investment, however, the
yak's story changes. He may allege that the mine turned out to be a
dud, or that the market has taken a downturn. In reality, of course,
the yak never made the investment. 50 Some consumers may not even
137. Id. at 11; Beware, supra note 60, at 22-23.
138. An aged corporation is one that has been incorporated for a number of months or
years, regardless of whether it has actually conducted any business.
139. To purchase a corporation "off the shelf" means to purchase the corporate name
and assets (if any) of an existing corporation, as opposed to incorporating an existing
business.
140. Chapman, supra note 21, at 11.
141. Id. at 12.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. 1993 House Hearing, supra note 38, at 34.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 20.
147. Gowen, supra note 93, at 137.
148. Id. at 196.
149. Telefraud, supra note 17, at 289-93.
150. Id.
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realize that they have been defrauded but simply believe that they
made a bad investment.151 More often, the yak simply disappears,
leaving the consumer with worthless gemstones, shares in a nonexis-
tent commodity, or a pile of dirt.152
2. How Con Artists Get Consumers' Cash
Telemarketing con artists have a variety of ways of actually get-
ting consumers' money. The most common is through the use of
credit cards,'153 but with current computer banking technology even
consumers who never send money or authorize credit card debits can
be victims.' 54 The simplest telemarketing scams rely on innocent con-
sumers who send money orders or reveal their credit card numbers
over the telephone in response to merchandise or prize offers.1
55
When they obtain credit card numbers, the boiler rooms then bill the
cards for inferior products, or submit unauthorized charges to the con-
sumers' accounts.156 Other swindlers use the credit card privileges of
legitimate merchants to obtain credit card numbers then charge those
accounts without the customers' knowledge.5 7
Some yaks may pose as representatives from a lender, credit card
company, or other service as a part of sales or prize qualification
schemes.' 58 They ask consumers to "verify" their identities by reciting
their credit card numbers, claiming that this is a prerequisite to eligi-
bility for the prize or purchase opportunity.'5 9 Consumers, believing
that they are speaking to the credit card company, are thus unaware
that they are actually disclosing the account numbers rather than sim-
ply verifying them.'6 One operation apparently acquired lists of
credit card numbers and simply asked victims for the expiration dates
in order to establish the cards' "validity." The boiler room claimed
that revealing the expiration date amounted to an acceptance of the
offer.
16
151. Chapman, supra note 21.
152. 1993 House Hearing, supra note 38, at 20.
153. See id. at 44.
154. See id. at 46-47.
155. See id. See also supra text accompanying notes 85-131 (discussing prize and mer-
chandise scams).
156. 1993 House Hearing, supra note 38, at 46-47.
157. 1992 Senate Hearing, supra note 2, at 4-5.
158. See, e.g., id. at 59 (fraudulent operation set up a legitimate credit card registration
service but defrauded consumers by charging their accounts for service claimed to be free
for six months).
159. See id.
160. Id. at 33-34.
161. Id.
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In a similar scheme, operators may ask consumers to reveal
checking account numbers in order to confirm a prize or purchase. 162
In the case of repeat victims, yaks may use sucker lists163 to obtain the
account numbers of consumers who have revealed them to other
telemarketers.' 64 After obtaining the account numbers, con artists
then use direct withdrawal to remove funds from the victims' accounts
electronically. 165 Consumers may not even be aware of the charge un-
til their next account statements arrive. 66 As mentioned above, there
is often a significant delay between the time the consumer is charged
and the delivery of the merchandise or service. 67 With travel scams,
for example, the victim is billed immediately, but typically does not
attempt to book the trip until many months later.168 This delay cre-
ates a window of several months during which an operator can retain
the same scam, yet remain undetected. 69
Some fraudulent telemarketers, unable to obtain merchant num-
bers needed to receive credit card debits or direct withdrawals, 7 ' rely
on illegal factoring to obtain payments.' 7' MasterCard and VISA
merchant contracts forbid factoring' 72 whereby legitimate merchants
process credit card sales generated by boiler room scams.' 73 By the
time the fraud is discovered and consumers begin to challenge the
charges, the telemarketer has typically disappeared. 71 The lender
and the legitimate merchant are left to fight over the losses generated
by credit card chargebacks; normally the unwitting merchant must
cover the losses. 75
As consumers have become more aware of credit card fraud, and
thus more reluctant to reveal account numbers over the telephone,
many fraudulent telemarketers have begun to rely on other methods
162. Kertz & Burnette, supra note 5, at 1042.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58 (describing use of sucker lists).
164. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58.
165. 1993 House Hearing, supra note 38, at 44-45.
166. Id.
167. 1988 Senate Hearing, supra note 21, at 58.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 58-60.
171. Id. at 60. Factoring in this context is a process whereby boiler room operators
establish relationships with legitimate but unsophisticated businesses and persuade the
merchants to debit credit cards on the boiler room's behalf, often for a percentage of the
sales. For example, some yaks convince merchants that they are starting up a new business
and that they need help submitting the drafts until-the yaks' own merchant accounts are
established. 1993 House Hearing, supra note 38, at 46-47.
172. 1993 House Hearing, supra note 38, at 46.
173. Id. at 46-47.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 47. See infra text accompanying notes 231-34 for discussion of factoring.
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of payment. Some request that the victim send a check or money or-
der to a mail drop via overnight express. 76 The use of express serv-
ices serves two purposes for the con artist. First, urgency is often a
tactic of many schemes. 77 Use of express couriers reinforces the vic-
tim's sense that he or she must act immediately or lose a valuable
opportunity. Second, fraudulent telemarketers who avoid using the
U.S. Postal Service avoid charges of mail fraud, a federal felony of-
fense. 78 Because express services and couriers often do not require
identification or address verification, yaks can pay their bills in cash
and ensure that their shipments and receipts cannot be traced to
them.
179
Some fraudulent telemarketers require their victims to send
money orders instead of personal checks. 80 Continuing the theme of
urgency, operators often convince consumers to send money orders by
claiming that they are unable to verify the consumer's creditworthi-
ness before the offer expires or before the supply of goods, prizes, or
investment opportunities is exhausted.' By demanding money or-
ders instead of personal checks, fraudulent telemarketers can cash the
orders immediately, instead of waiting for personal checks (usually
from another state) to clear. Moreover, the scam artists avoid being
traced through bank records in the event the fraud is detected.8 2
3. The Disappearing Act
Telemarketing fraud is widespread, difficult to detect, and hard to
prosecute because perpetrators are easily able to cover their tracks.183
The yaks never come face-to-face with their victims, so no eyewitness
identification can take place. The primary tools of a telemarketing
scam-telephone service, office space, and express shipping services-
are easily acquired anonymously, and can be abandoned almost in-
stantly when a fraud is detected. Even the most elaborate and sophis-
ticated schemes, such as those involving investments and products, can
be dismantled almost overnight.'84
176. See, e.g., Tassy, supra note 24, at B4.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
178. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1988). The Postal Service is one of the nation's more active
investigative agencies, so telemarketers benefit further from escaping its attention. 1992
Senate Hearing, supra note 2, at 12.
179. 1992 Senate Hearing, supra note 2, at 12.
180. See, e.g., Gowen, supra note 93, at 127.
181. See, e.g., id.
182. See, e.g., id.
183. 1988 Senate Hearing, supra note 21, at 58.
184. See 1993 House Hearing, supra note 38, at 45.
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Boiler room operators can usually close down and move on
before authorities are ever alerted because consumers initially believe
that they are dealing with a legitimate business. Victims may contact
the boiler room to complain about the value of the merchandise re-
ceived or the lack of return on their investments.185 Only the lack of a
satisfactory response will lead victims to believe that they have been
defrauded. Thus, the scam operators are alerted to consumer discon-
tent before the victims contact authorities about the fraud. By the
time an investigation begins, the boiler room has disappeared, leaving
behind a trail of victims but little trace of its operators'
whereabouts. 86
More important, almost all scams are conducted strictly inter-
state, 87 making it virtually impossible for local authorities investigat-
ing a victim's complaint to investigate or pursue the fraud at its
source. Even if local authorities are able to pinpoint the state where
the fraud originated, it is difficult to research and gather evidence in
another, often distant state. Furthermore, local authorities have
neither the incentive nor the resources to investigate a crime that did
not victimize local residents. This jurisdictional Catch-22188 creates a
very effective loophole, enabling fraudulent telemarketers to slip
through the cracks in local law enforcement.'89
Victims' frequent reluctance to report the fraud adds to the diffi-
culty in detecting and prosecuting fraudulent telemarketers. Accord-
ing to the Harris survey, only thirty-one percent of those polled who
felt they had been cheated by fraudulent telemarketers actually re-
ported their loss. 19° The actual incidence of fraudulent telemarketing
may be vastly underestimated, thus, authorities are frequently una-
ware of the full scope of the problem.' 9' Furthermore, victims' testi-
mony is often the only evidence against the perpetrators when charges
are brought against a fraudulent operation. Lack of such testimony
therefore makes verdicts difficult to obtain.' 92
Part of the reason for victims' reticence is likely psychological.
Fraud, unlike other torts or crimes, requires some degree of action by
185. See, e.g., Gowen, supra note 93, at 127.
186. See id.
187. See 1993 House Hearing, supra note 38, at 35.
188. Obstacles facing state authorities who prosecute fraudulent telemarketers are dis-
cussed in greater detail infra text accompanying notes 276-305.
189. 1993 House Hearing, supra note 38, at 35.
190. 1992 Senate Hearing, supra note 2, at 28.
191. Id. at 9.
192. See 1993 House Hearing, supra note 38, at 16-22.
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the victim. 93 Telemarketing fraud in particular requires the victim's
active participation. If the consumer simply hangs up on the fraudu-
lent telemarketer, no theft can take place. 194 Victims, however inno-
cent and well-intentioned, must send money or disclose a credit card
or bank account number to perpetrators. Those who discover the
fraud may feel foolish, ashamed, and even guilty for having been
fooled. Thus, even victims who have been repeatedly defrauded for
large amounts may be reluctant to report it to authorities. 95 Two vic-
tims who testified at the Senate Subcommittee on Communications
hearings on telemarketing fraud had not even told family members of
the fraud.196 One consumer even refused to testify, out of shame over
the incident.197
Even victims who wish to report telemarketing fraud may not
know where to turn. The Harris survey found that only five percent of
those polled had heard of state or local consumer protection offices. 9 8
Only fourteen percent knew that the United States Attorney General
handles consumer protection complaints. 199 Two-thirds of those sur-
veyed did not know where to call to find out whether a telephone
solicitation was legitimate.2"
4. Victims of Telemarketing Fraud
Losses due to telemarketing fraud extend beyond the victims who
are defrauded. The practice clearly victimizes consumers who fall
prey to its sales pitches, but there are many other victims as well.
Credit card companies, lending institutions, and legitimate
telemarketers all suffer from the financial loss and decline in con-
sumer confidence wrought by telemarketing scams. 20 ' Anyone who
holds a credit card or has a bank account pays for telemarketing fraud
through increased interest rates or annual fees.2"2 Finally, the busi-
ness and reputation loss to legitimate telemarketers trickles down to
other industries in the form of reduced sales to suppliers and manufac-
193. Spiegel, supra note 25, at C3.
194. Id.
195. See Gowen, supra note 93; Chapman, supra note 21.
196. 1992 Senate Hearing, supra note 2, at 10.
197. Id.
198. 1993 House Hearing, supra note 38, at 33.
199. Id.
200. 1992 Senate Hearing, supra note 2, at 28.
201. 1993 House Hearing, supra note 38, at 44-45.
202. Id. at 45.
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turers of goods sold by telephone and lost employment opportunities
in telemarketing.2"3
a. Consumers
Consumers are the most obvious victims of fraudulent
telemarketing practices. Although no one with a telephone is immune
to fraud, telephone scam artists prefer to target some of the most vul-
nerable members of society-the elderly.2" According to one former
scam operator, retired persons make good victims for several rea-
sons.2 °5 They tend to be home during the day, and are often bored,
lonesome, and eager to chat on the telephone. Some older people
have poor memories, and few of them commit telephone conversa-
tions to writing or ask for written guarantees.20 6 They are often trust-
ing, and therefore vulnerable to the yaks' specious oral guarantees.
Most important, older people frequently have substantial savings that
they are eager to spend on what they believe to be bargain merchan-
dise, discount travel, and lucrative investment opportunities.2 °7
Even worse, the elderly are most likely to be repeat victims of
telemarketing scams. The same vulnerability and sense of hope that
initially lead them to believe yaks' sales pitches may cause them to fall
for such schemes repeatedly. Investment scams, in particular, may
target victims who previously sent money to bogus investors.20 8 An
operation may charge large fees, for example, to "consolidate" the
victim's fraudulent investments.20 9 Other scams simply capitalize on
the victim's enthusiasm and desire to make money fast. One gem-
stone scam claimed to have found a buyer for the victim's stones, but
required the victim to purchase one more stone to "complete the col-
lection"21 and seal the deal. The victim would then pay even more
money to the con artist, send in the worthless stones, and receive
nothing in return.211
The stories of eldefly people losing their life savings to
telemarketing scams are numerous and tragic.21 2 A ninety-four year-
203. Fraudulent telemarketers frequently fail to pay for rent and other services, thereby
causing losses to landlords, long distance telephone companies, express package services,
and suppliers. 1992 Senate Hearing, supra note 2, at 9.
204. Id. at 5. See Sennott, supra note 56, at A8.
205. See Spiegel, supra note 25, at C3; 1993 House Hearing, supra note 38, at 21.
206. See Spiegel, supra note 25, at C3.
207. See id.; 1993 House Hearing, supra note 38, at 21.
208. See Telefraud, supra note 17, at 292.
209. 1993 House Hearing, supra note 38, at 32-34.
210. Id. at 34.
211. Id.
212. See, e.g., Spiegel, supra note 25; Sennott, supra note 56, at Al.
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old psychologist was driven into bankruptcy after losing $179,000 to
more than seventy different boiler rooms over a period of two
years.213 An elderly woman who lost $69,000 to prize and merchan-
dise scams continued to fall prey to the telemarketers, who called
even as her family attempted to recover the money she had already
lost.2 14
While the elderly are the most common and most tragic victims of
telemarketing fraud, no group is immune. Even cautious consumers
and investors can fall prey to the elaborate schemes. For instance, a
California school teacher lost $20,000 to an investment scam claiming
to be a film production company.215 The operation had sent her a
prospectus, a contract, and glossy brochures detailing the alleged
movie-in-progress, convincing her it was legitimate before she in-
vested.216 An Ohio attorney who invested $60,000 in a Texas oil well
scam received a total of $5.41 for his investment.21 7 A New Hamp-
shire doctor, convinced by a certificate of authenticity and money-
back guarantee, sent four thousand dollars to a New York boiler room
for three fake Salvadore Dali prints;
218
The psychological impact of telemarketing fraud intensifies vic-
tims' losses. The shame and humiliation of having been "taken" by a
fraudulent sales pitch only worsens the financial injury. No matter
how convincing a scam appeared, or how small the loss, consumers
often feel they could have and should have avoided being victimized.
The same feelings of guilt and foolishness that prevent consumers
from reporting the fraud in the first place may render consumers re-
luctant to make any investments, or to purchase any goods over the
telephone.219 Thus, telemarketing fraud could have devastating ef-
fects on many areas of the economy.
b. Legitimate Telemarketers
Despite the prevalence of fraud in the industry, legal telemarket-
ing is still an important, economically significant business practice.
Legitimate telemarketing firms are numerous, profitable, and provide
millions of valuable sales and employment opportunities.220 Fraud,
however, gives the telemarketing industry a bad name. Already "the
213. Sennott, supra note 56, at Al, A8.
214. Gowen, supra note 93, at 127.
215. Chapman, supra note 21, at 11.
216. Id.
217. Telefraud, supra note 17, at 292.
218. Id. at 290-91.
219. See 1993 House Hearing, supra note 38, at 45.
220. Riordan, supra note 4, at W12.
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most maligned profession since used car sales,"22' the telemarketing
industry suffers from the reputation of being a business fraught with
fraud.222 Publicity about fraudulent telemarketers makes consumers
generally more suspicious and reluctant to purchase goods by tele-
phone, and telemarketers may have difficulty regaining the confidence
of consumers who have been defrauded by unscrupulous scam art-
ists. 223 Furthermore, many sales opportunities are lost when victims,
who otherwise would have purchased legitimate goods by telephone,
purchase substandard goods from con artists instead.22 Finally,
telemarketing has been made more costly and more difficult due to
closer scrutiny from credit card companies, lenders, and vendors.225
c. Credit Card Companies and Lenders
Telemarketing scam operators frequently bill fraudulent charges
to the victims' credit cards. Consumers who discover the fraud (when
they receive substandard goods or no goods at all) will often cancel
the transactions with their lending institutions, a process known as a
chargeback.226 Lenders normally recoup the chargebacks from the
merchants.227 In the case of boiler room sales, however, the sellers
can seldom be located to be held accountable for the charges.
228
Thus, when consumers challenge fraudulent credit card charges, lend-
ing institutions must normally absorb the resulting losses. These
losses can be substantial.229 MasterCard and Visa have estimated that
financial institutions lose over three hundred million dollars per year
to telemarketing fraud.23°
Other boiler room operators factor the fraudulent charges
through legitimate merchants.231 In such cases, either the factor-the
legitimate business making the charges on behalf of the boiler room
operation-or the lender must absorb the charges.232 Some operators
even factor credit card charges through several merchants at once to
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. 1993 House Hearing, supra note 38, at 45; H.R. REP. No. 103-20, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1993).
224. Id.
225. 1988 Senate Hearing, supra note 21, at 59-61.
226. Id. at 59.
227. 1993 House Hearing, supra note 38, at 45.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 42.
230. Id. at 45. This figure has increased from MasterCard and Visa's 1988 estimate of
$100 million per year. 1988 Senate Hearing, supra note 21, at 59.
231. 1988 Senate Hearing, supra note 21, at 60. See supra notes 170-73 and accompany-
ing text for explanation of factoring.
232. 1988 Senate Hearing, supra note 21, at 60.
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avoid detection.233 Losses to the legitimate merchants forced to ab-
sorb fraudulent charges are significant, and may even drive factoring
merchants into bankruptcy.234
Current Prosecution Mechanisms and Their
Limitations
The current mechanisms for prosecuting telemarketing fraud are
inadequate to combat this growing problem. The primary devices
used to prevent and prosecute fraudulent telemarketing are the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act (FTC Act),235 the Racketeering and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act (RICO),2 3 6 and state consumer protection
laws. Although the FTC has recently been active in investigating
telemarketing fraud on a national level, the agency has inadequate
resources and insufficient rulemaking authority to combat the prob-
lem effectively. 237 Actions under RICO are complex and difficult to
prosecute because they require a showing of often hard-to-prove pat-
terns of criminal activity.238 State laws alone, no matter how strong,
are inadequate to combat interstate telemarketing fraud on a nation-
wide scale.
A. Federal Trade Commission Act
The FTC, under the authority of the FTC Act, 9 has been the
most active regulatory agency in the fight against interstate
telemarketing fraud.240 As of February 1993, the FTC had brought
over ninety telemarketing fraud cases in federal court.24 1 Unfortu-
nately, however, the FTC has insufficient investigative abilities, fund-
ing, and rulemaking authority to pursue fraudulent telemarketing
effectively.
Although the FTC is empowered to conduct investigations as it
deems necessary, 242 it is not historically an investigative agency. It re-
lies on consumer complaints to detect and prosecute fraudulent
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq. (1988).
236. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
237. H.R. REP. No. 103-20, supra note 223, at 2-4.
238. Id. at 7.
239. 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq. (1988).
240. H.R. REP. No. 103-20, supra note 223, at 2-3.
241. Id.
242. See 16 C.F.R. § 18(b) (1994).
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telemarketing operations.243 The FTC is relatively new to the busi-
ness of combatting telemarketing fraud, and depends upon coopera-
tion from local attorneys general, the United States Attorney, the
United States Postal Service,244 and even the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation 245 (FBI) to investigate complaints of fraudulent telemarket-
ing. Because it has limited funding for investigations, the FTC is
forced to enlist the aid of other law enforcement agencies to conduct
discovery, obtain evidence, and pursue actions against telemarketing
scams.246 Nonetheless, by working with authorities in many states, the
FTC has been able to construct a database of fraudulent
telemarketers, the National Telemarketing Fraud Database,247 to aid
in its investigations of consumer complaints.
248
The FTC Act prohibits "unfair or deceptive ... practices" that
affect interstate commerce 249 and authorizes the FTC to seek injunc-
tive relief against such unfair or deceptive trade practices. Currently,
neither the FTC Act nor the FTC rules specifically address
telemarketing fraud.250 This omission may restrict the FTC's ability to
obtain injunctive relief because such relief depends upon the FIC's
ability to convince courts that a suspect firm's telemarketing practices
are, in fact, unfair or deceptive.25'
Such a showing can be more difficult than it seems. Consumer
testimony is frequently the only available proof of telemarketing
fraud, especially in cases where the products or guarantees are misrep-
resented.252 As a defense to such testimony, defendants are often able
to allege that the consumer misunderstood the terms of the offer, or
that a refund was never requested.253 Consequently, the defendants
may be required to pay restitution to a few consumers, but are gener-
ally free to resume their telemarketing activities immediately.
Notwithstanding these limitations, injunctive relief is the FTC's
main weapon against fraudulent telemarketers who operate across
243. See 16 C.F.R. § 2.1 (1994).
244. 1993 House Hearing, supra note 38, at 18.
245. Id. at 16.
246. Id.
247. The National Telemarketing Fraud Database is used to aid law enforcement agen-
cies in discovering and ferreting out fraudulent telemarketers by identifying common char-
acteristics and signs of fraudulent operators. See id.
248. Id.
249. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1988).
250. H.R. REP. No. 103-20, supra note 223, at 3.
251. Id.; see also FTC v. Pioneer Enters., 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,154.
252. See H.R. REP. No. 103-20, supra note 223, at 3-4.
253. See id.
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state lines.25 4 The FTC can request courts to issue preliminary injunc-
tions against fraudulent telemarketing operations in order to prevent
further injury to consumers pending a final judgment.255 Final relief
usually includes restitution of consumers' money,256 fines, and perma-
nent injunctions prohibiting defendants from engaging in any further
telemarketing operations.257 Courts may also require defendants to
post bonds before they can resume telemarketing activities in order to
protect future consumers.258
Injunctive relief can have little effect, however, if it is not en-
forced. A further limitation of the FTC's power is that it lacks author-
ity to bring criminal contempt charges.259 Instead, it must rely on
state and federal law enforcement agencies to bring criminal contempt
charges against telemarketers who violate injunctions.26 Telemarket-
ing fraud has a high rate of recidivism, and the danger that injunctions
will be violated is great.261 When scam artists are able to make huge
amounts of money quickly, the deterrent effect of civil sanctions such
as fines and penalties may be minimal. Imprisonment may be the only
effective solution.262
B. RICO
Fraudulent telemarketers may be prosecuted in federal court
under RICO.263 RICO has both civil and criminal provisions, thus a
private party264 or the government 265 may bring a RICO action. To
obtain a verdict against an offending telemarketer under the RICO
statute, the plaintiff or prosecutor must show that the telemarketer
engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity.266
254. Id. at 3.
255. 1993 House Hearing, supra note 38, at 19.
256. See, e.g., FTC v. Pioneer Enters., 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,154.
257. See, e.g., FTC v. Wetherill, 1993-1 rade Cas. (CCH) 70,203.
258. 1993 House Hearing, supra note 38, at 19.
259. Id. at 20.
260. See id. at 19.
261. Id.
262. Id.; see also 1989 House Hearing, supra note 84, at 114 (testimony of convicted
former broker: "You definitely need tougher penalties. I think without a doubt, jail.., is
a deterrent .... [J]ail is one of the biggest deterrents to end what is going on in the
industry today").
263. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988). See, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, 819 F. Supp.
1510 (D. Colo. 1993). For further discussion of RICO prosecution of fraudulent
telemarketers, see Ellen M. Faro, Note, Telemarketing Credit Card Fraud: Is RICO One
Answer?, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 675 (1990).
264. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Hollingsworth, 931 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir.
1991).
265. See, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, 819 F. Supp. 1510 (D. Colo. 1993).
266. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
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The statute defines racketeering to include wire fraud26 7 and mail
fraud.2 68 Wire fraud is defined as:
[A]ny scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or
property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations,
or promises ... transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television
communication in interstate or foreign commerce, [and] any writ-
ings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing
such scheme or artifice .... 269
Because fraudulent telemarketing usually falls within this definition,
the racketeering element is easily met.
A "pattern" is somewhat more difficult to prove. In order to
show a pattern of activity to trigger RICO liability, the prosecutor
must introduce evidence of at least two fraudulent acts showing a con-
tinuity of activity.270 Courts are reluctant to find continuity over short
periods of time, however.271 Generally, a threat that the activity will
continue into the future is required, but "[p]redicate acts extending
over a few weeks or months and threatening no future criminal con-
duct do not satisfy this [continuity] requirement. ' 27 2 A finding of con-
tinuity is intensely factual, and may be difficult to prove because
prosecutors often have little physical evidence of the fraud and only a
few consumer complaints on which to base a case.273 Because of the
transient nature of telemarketing boiler room operations, it is often
difficult to show that a single operation is responsible for activities
extending over a period of time. Thus, the continuity requirement is
frequently a barrier to civil recovery as well as criminal liability under
RICO.
A finding of a RICO offense further requires an "enterprise," or
a relationship between the predicate acts alleged to constitute the pat-
tern.274 A relationship exists when the acts "have the same or similar
purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or
are otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not
isolated events. ' 275 Boiler rooms relocate and reappear so rapidly
that authorities often cannot prove that one operation having the
same participants is responsible for multiple offenses. The enterprise
267. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1988).
268. Id. § 1341.
269. Id. § 1343.
270. Id. § 1961(5).
271. See First Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Hollingsworth, 931 F.2d 1295, 1303 (8th Cir.
1991).
272. Id. at 1303.
273. H.R. REP. No. 103-20, supra note 223, at 3-4.
274. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988).
275. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 3575 (repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984))).
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requirement therefore makes RICO relatively ineffective as a weapon
against clever boiler room operators.
Lack of physical evidence and the transient nature of telemarket-
ing scams pose significant problems in proving a pattern of corrupt
activity in order to trigger RICO liability. Although successful RICO
actions can lead to both civil remedies and criminal charges, the diffi-
culty of prosecuting actions under the statute deters its use against
fraudulent telemarketers. Thus, much of the burden of criminal pros-
ecution of is left in the hands of state authorities.
C. State Telemarketing Laws
Many states have enacted strict consumer protection laws regu-
lating the activities of telemarketers. This section focuses on the laws
of three states where telemarketing fraud has proliferated: California,
Florida, and Nevada. Some state laws include a registration require-
ment to facilitate locating the telemarketer if a consumer complaint is
registered. Many include consumer disclosure requirements. State
telemarketing laws also typically incorporate substantial criminal pen-
alties, such as fines or imprisonment, for fraudulent telemarketers.
Typical state law civil remedies include injunctions against further
telemarketing sales activities, restitution and rescission, and actual
and exemplary damages.
1. California
California, once a popular location for boiler rooms, 276 enacted
telemarketing regulations in 1985.277 These regulations require all
telemarketing businesses to register with the Consumer Law Section
of the Department of Justice278 for an annual fee of fifty dollars.279
The registration law defines telephonic sellers2 ° and requires them to
submit the names, addresses, dates of birth, driver's license numbers,
276. Telefraud, supra note 17, at 289.
277. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17511 et seq., added by 1985 Cal. Stats. ch. 1009, § 1.
278. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17511.3 (West Supp. 1994). Registration was formerly
handled by the Secretary of State's office.
279. Id.
280. The California Business and Professions Code defines a telephonic seller as fol-
lows: "'[A] person who, on his or her own behalf or through salespersons or through the
use of an automatic dialing-annouhcing device ... causes a telephone solicitation or at-
tempted telephone solicitation ... [when] the telephonic seller initiates telephonic contact
with a prospective purchaser." Id. § 17511.1. Section 17511.1 also defines as sellers tele-
phone solicitors who require purchases or any charges, other than actual shipping charges,
in exchange for a gift or prize; a seller responding to inquiries generated by advertisements
is also subject to the law if the product the seller offers is a precious metal, gemstone, or
mineral deposits. Id.
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and criminal records of all persons involved in telephone sales.281 Op-
erators must furnish copies of their sales scripts, information such as
brochures or literature, and descriptions of the products or services
being sold. 82 The law expressly includes sellers doing business in Cal-
ifornia and those who solicit prospective purchasers who live in
California.283
The registration requirement enables the Attorney General's of-
fice to distinguish boiler room operations from legitimate ones on the
basis of the information contained in the form.2  Moreover, having
detailed information on file makes it easier to investigate and prose-
cute frauds once they are reported by consumers. Pursuant to the re-
gistration law, California authorities were able to charge more than
fifty individuals within the first year after the statute was enacted.285
Under the California law, telephone sellers must disclose relevant
and material information to prospective purchasers before a sales
transaction is completed.286 If the seller represents that the buyer will
receive a free item or a gift, the seller must disclose its address, the
odds of receiving the prize having the highest value (if multiple prizes
are represented), and the number of individuals who have received
the prize during the last twelve months.28 7 If the seller offers miner-
als, metals, or stones, it must disclose its address, its ownership in the
mineral, and other information to substantiate any claims of the re-
source's earning or profit potential. 8 Finally, if the seller represents
that office equipment or supplies are being sold at discount prices, it
must reveal its address and the name of the manufacturer of each al-
legedly discount item the customer wishes to purchase.289 These dis-
closure requirements protect consumers without unduly burdening
legitimate telemarketing businesses, because they are narrowly tai-
lored to target common fraud areas.
2. Florida
The Florida Communications Fraud Act 290 (Act), enacted in
1987,291 makes it a felony offense to defraud via telephone for any
281. Id. § 17511.4.
282. Id.
283. Id. § 17511.3.
284. Telefraud, supra note 17, at 293.
285. Id.




290. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.034 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994).
291. 1987 Fla. Laws ch. 87-382, § 1.
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aggregate amount over three hundred dollars.292 Fraudulent opera-
tions netting under three hundred dollars are punishable as misde-
meanors. 293 In adopting the Act, the Florida Legislature explicitly
recognized the insidious nature of telemarketing fraud:
The Legislature recognizes that schemes to defraud have prolifer-
ated in the United States in recent years and that many operators of
schemes to defraud use communications technology to solicit vic-
tims and thereby conceal their identities and overcome a victim's
normal resistance to sales pressure by delivering a personalized
sales message.294
The statute was enacted because Florida's liberal business laws
had made it a haven for telemarketing scam artists. 295 Within two
weeks after the Act became effective, at least ten boiler room opera-
tors fled the state in response to subpoenas.296
3. Nevada
Telemarketing fraud became a growth industry in Nevada during
the 1980s.29 7 The state is thus one of the more recent entrants into the
field of telemarketing fraud legislation. The Nevada Legislature en-
acted extensive legislation directed against telemarketing fraud in
1989.298 Nevada's law requires registration of telemarketers and all
sales employees. 299 The initial registration fee is six thousand dollars,
with renewal fees of one hundred dollars per year.300 Each seller must
also post a bond of fifty thousand dollars to provide security in the
event a consumer is defrauded.3° ' Sellers must make disclosures to
consumers similar to those required in California. 3°2  All
telemarketers must provide refunds upon a customer's written request
if goods or services are defective. 30 3 Finally, telephone sellers are for-
bidden to disclose the names or addresses of their customers to other
businesses.3" This requirement prevents the distribution and sale of
292. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.034(4)(b)(1) (West 1988).
293. Id. § 817.034(4)(b)(2).
294. Id. § 817.034(1)(a) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994).
295. Telefraud, supra note 17, at 289.
296. Id. at 292.
297. 1992 Senate Hearing, supra note 2, at 2 (testimony of Hon. Richard H. Bryan of
Nevada).
298. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 599B.005 et seq. (Michie Supp. 1993) (as amended by
Acts 1993, ch. 509).
299. Id. § 599B.120.
300. Id.
301. Id. § 599B.100(2).
302. Id. § 599B.170. For California's disclosure requirements, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 276-89.
303. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 599B.190.
304. Id. § 599B.200.
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sucker lists among boiler room operators. Civil and criminal penalties
are available against violators of any provision of the law, including
failure to register.0
D. Conclusion
Despite the attention of state legislatures to the problem of
telemarketing fraud, state laws cannot eradicate the scams. First, even
the most exhaustive state law can do little to protect against calls
made from out of state. For example, although the California and Ne-
vada registration laws specifically apply to out-of-state sellers, state
authorities have little redress if they cannot locate out-of-state sellers
who fail to register. Similarly, the state law criminal penalties are
often impossible to enforce against out-of-state offenders, because it is
difficult to obtain jurisdiction. Even if the out-of-state boiler room
operators can be located, proving contact with California or Nevada
consumers may be impossible.
Furthermore, the Florida law's success at driving fraudulent
telemarketers beyond the state's borders serves to underscore the
need for federal regulation. Boiler rooms driven out of one state will
seek out other states that lack strict laws or stringent enforcement.
State enforcement can never be successful if some states lack the re-
sources or the initiative to prosecute.
III
Possible and Proposed Solutions
Congress has discussed the issue of telemarketing fraud repeat-
edly, with no resolution.3 6 Solutions proposed at these hearings have
included a citizen's private right of action against fraudulent
telemarketers, federal actions by state authorities, and increased FTC
oversight of telemarketers.30 7 These solutions, however, only address
part of the problem. An effective federal law should emphasize deter-
rence, detection, and prosecution of fraudulent telemarketing activi-
ties without unduly interfering with legitimate telemarketers. This
section suggests three elements of a comprehensive law: requiring na-
tional registration of all telephone sales operations; increasing the
FTC's investigative and prosecutorial power; and enabling state au-
thorities to sue fraudulent telemarketers in federal court.
305. Id. §§ 599B.245 to .260.
306. S. REP. No. 130, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1993).
307. See H.R. 868, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
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A. Congressional Efforts to Combat Telemarketing Fraud
Each Congress since 1983 has discussed the problem of
telemarketing fraud without resolution, 08 but in 1993, both houses of
the 103rd Congress unanimously passed The Consumer Protection
Telemarketing Act.3" It would have required the FTC to promulgate
rules to prohibit deceptive, fraudulent, and abusive telemarketing
practices.310 Unfortunately, President Clinton failed to sign the bill
into law. Finally, the Senate and the House in 1993 introduced a new
bill to amend the FTC Act to authorize increased FTC rulemaking to
combat telemarketing fraud and to appropriate funds to expand the
FTC's investigative and adjudicative abilities." The proposed
amendments were still being debated last session.
Thus far, all proposed telemarketing legislation has focused on
expanding the FTC's power to combat fraudulent telemarketing. Tes-
timony as early as the 1988 Senate hearings on proposed amendments
to the FTC Act criticized the Commission for its poor enforcement
record against telemarketing scams. 2 The FTC has also been ac-
cused of unnecessary delays in decisionmaking.313 More recently,
however, FTC commissioners have testified that the FTC's improved
efforts over the past several years have led to increased injunctions
and civil penalties. 4  Congress' lack of success in enacting
telemarketing fraud legislation may be due in part to disagreement
over the FTC's effectiveness as an enforcement agency.31 5 Nonethe-
less, it is certain that any Congressional action in this area will involve
the FTC as the chief agency in the fight against telemarketing fraud.
308. In 1983 the 98th Congress Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Trans-
portation introduced S. 1714 to expand the FTC's authority to combat fraudulent tele-
phone sales practices. The Senate, however, never acted on the bill. S. REP. No. 103-130,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-7 (1993). The 99th Congress Senate passed S. 1078, a variation on
the earlier bill, but the House did not approve it. Id. In the 100th Congress, both the
Senate and the House passed differing versions of S. 677, but the versions were never
reconciled. Id. During the 101st Congress, the Senate again passed a bill, S. 1249, and
again the House took no action. Id. The 102d Congress found another bill, S. 3150, re-
ported to the Senate Committee, and again the full Senate did not act. Id. For an overview
of these bills, see Patrick E. Michela, Comment, "You May Have Already Won . 7 .":
Telemarketing Fraud and the Need for a Federal Legislative Solution, 21 PEPP. L. REv. 553
(1994).
309. S. 1179, H.R. 868, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
310. H.R. REP. No. 103-20, supra note 223, at 1-11.
311. See S. 1179, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (Federal Trade Commission Act Amend-
ments of 1993).
312. See 1988 Senate Hearing, supra note 21, at 44-49 (statement of the FTC).
313. S. REP. No. 130, supra note 306, at 2.
314. Id.; see 1993 House Hearing, supra note 38, at 16-17.
315. 1993 House Hearing, supra note 38, at 2.
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B. Proposed Solutions
Perpetrators' easy mobility, anonymity, and high rate of repeat
offense increase the prevalence of telemarketing fraud. Therefore,
detecting and monitoring fraudulent operations are important compo-
nents in investigation and prosecution. Because of the interstate na-
ture of telemarketing fraud, any effective solution to the widespread
problem must be a national one. Detection and monitoring can be
accomplished at the state andlocal levels, but federal oversight is nec-
essary to keep local officials apprised of interstate movement of fraud-
ulent telemarketers. More important, the combined power of state
and federal authorities to bring and enforce federal actions may be the
only effective weapon against interstate offenders. Thus, an effective
law will authorize a combination of state and federal actions: national
registration of telephone sellers, increased FTC power to investigate
interstate operations, and empowerment of local officials to bring ac-
tions against interstate telemarketers in federal courts.
1. National Registration of Telephone Sales Operations
Deterrence is the most effective goal in reducing the harm caused
by fraudulent telemarketers. If the fraud is made less lucrative and
harder to get away with, it will be far less prevalent. Many states,
including California316 and Nevada,317 have effectively reduced fraud-
ulent telemarketing, yet protected legitimate telephone sellers by en-
acting registration requirements. Unfortunately, however, the effect
of a registration requirement in a single state is often to drive the
boiler rooms into other states.318 If all telephone sellers were required
to register with a single federal agency such as the FTC, fraudulent
telemarketers could no longer continue their frauds by simply relocat-
ing them across state lines. A federal registration requirement could
be imposed in addition to any state registration; states could be free to
adopt stricter registration standards or to mirror the federal standard.
A federal registration law could require any business selling prod-
ucts by telephone to register annually, for a fee. Fees thus generated
could pay for administration of such a requirement and maintenance
of a computer databank of telephonic sellers. Registrants could be
required to reveal information that would help authorities to identify
the operation in the event of a consumer complaint, such as: the
owner's name, place of business, and Social Security number; the
name and nature of the business (such as seller of goods or services,
316. See supra text accompanying notes 276-89.
317. See supra text accompanying notes 297-305.
318. See Telefraud, supra note 17, at 293.
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travel agency, or investment broker); a description of any goods or
services sold; and copies of sales scripts and guarantees given to con-
sumers. Businesses, once registered, could be issued an identifying
registration number. to be used to index and identify the business in
the future.319
To further the end of deterring boiler room operations, a registra-
tion law must include substantial penalties for noncompliance. To fa-
cilitate discovery of noncomplying businesses, federal law could
require all advertising by telemarketers, including unsolicited sales
pitches, to disclose the seller's identifying number. Thus, advertise-
ments or sales scripts that did not reveal the sellers' identification
numbers would immediately be suspect.
Naturally, a registration requirement risks unduly burdening gov-
ernment agencies and legitimate businesses, without a corresponding
effect upon the offending boiler room operators. Given the effective-
ness of registration requirements at the state level, and the ineffective-
ness of current FTC and other federal efforts to fight fraudulent
telemarketing, however, a national registration requirement is an op-
tion worth trying. Congress should direct the FTC to construct regis-
tration requirements for all telemarketers, to expand the National
Telemarketing Fraud Database,320 and to establish strict penalties for
nonregistration.
2. FTC Investigative Authority
The major obstacles to the FTC's efforts to combat fraudulent
telemarketers are problems in locating the perpetrators, inadequate
investigative ability, and lack of authority to enforce judgments once
they have been obtained. As discussed above, a registration require-
ment addresses the first obstacle by helping the FTC, local law en-
forcement agencies, and other federal agencies to identify and locate
boiler room operations.
The second obstacle could be overcome if the FTC had greater
independent investigative and enforcement ability. Currently, the
FTC must rely on help from other agencies to compel physical evi-
dence from defendants.32' Without the cooperation of the other agen-
cies, the FTC's only evidence is consumer complaints and other
319. A registration requirement could also have a deterrent effect. Prospective opera-
tors with criminal records would be discouraged by the personal disclosure requirements,
and strict noncompliance penalties would discourage telemarketers from operating without
a license.
320. See supra notes 247-48 and accompanying text.
321. See S. REP. No. 130, supra note 306, at 2.
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evidence obtained from victims. As a result, the FTC often lacks the
ability to obtain injunctive relief in federal courts due to a lack of
evidence of the defendants' intent or knowledge of fraud.
The last obstacle would be overcome if the FTC had the power to
bring criminal contempt charges to enforce permanent injunctions.322
With the power to enforce injunctions itself, the FTC would not have
to rely on help from other agencies to combat telemarketing fraud
effectively. Moreover, effective federal enforcement would reduce the
prosecutorial burden on local enforcement, which is often duplicative
and ineffective beyond the borders of the enforcing state.
3. Authorize State Attorneys General to Bring Actions in Federal Court
No matter how effective the federal effort is in combatting fraud-
ulent telemarketing, it will remain a local concern. Consumers will
continue to seek help from local authorities, and immediate local ac-
tion is quicker and more efficient than waiting for a federal agency to
act. Unfortunately, however, individual state actions are often inef-
fective against activity that takes place outside the state's borders.323
In order to increase the effectiveness of local regulations, Congress
should authorize state authorities to bring actions against interstate
telemarketers directly in federal court, if they meet the amount in
controversy requirement of fifty thousand dollars. If local authorities
could go straight to federal court, national injunctions could be issued
immediately. Nationwide injunctions would halt fraudulent opera-
tions entirely rather than just encouraging perpetrators to relocate to
other states.
Moreover, because fraudulent telemarketing operations almost
always have victims in more than one state, state authorities could
consolidate their efforts in federal courts instead of simply duplicating
litigation that has already begun in other states. 324 Duplicative litiga-
tion is a waste of state law enforcement authorities' time and re-
sources, and too often it turns out to be fruitless for victims.
Defrauded consumers in some states recover nothing because the
boiler room's assets have already been dispersed to victims in other
states. A consolidated federal action could at least divide the restitu-
tion amount among all of the defrauded victims.
322. See id.
323. 1988 Senate Hearing, supra note 21, at 36-37.
324. For example, the FTC brought a federal action against Amy Travel Service, FTC v.
Amy TRavel Serv., Inc., 1990-2 Tade Cas. (CCH) 69,160, after six states had already sued
Amy Travel during the same year. 1988 Senate Hearing, supra note 21, at 33. Although
state authorities were able to act quickly against the travel scam, they were unable to ob-
tain national injunctive relief, thus the FFC had to act also.
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If local authorities were permitted to sue fraudulent
telemarketers directly in federal court, their combined efforts, along
with the FTC's, could pose a formidable threat to boiler room opera-
tors nationally. If national enforcement through this mechanism is as
effective as local enforcement has been in certain states, the country
could finally begin to see a decrease in the incidence of this pervasive
and insidious type of fraud.
IV
Conclusion
Telemarketing fraud is a national problem, requiring a national
solution. This type of fraud is particularly insidious because its perpe-
trators prey on victims within the privacy of their own homes. Too
often, the victims of fraudulent telemarketers are elderly and ill-
equipped to pursue legal remedies for themselves. Even worse, many
victims tend to be repeat victims. Any effective solution will accom-
plish three goals: aid in detecting fraudulent telemarketers by recog-
nizing the anonymous nature of the fraud; eliminate the jurisdictional
problems and loopholes resulting from the interstate conduct of
telemarketing fraud; and, protect legitimate telemarketing businesses
from overly restrictive legislation. A balance between these concerns
can be struck through a national registration requirement, a federal
right of action by state authorities, and increased investigative author-
ity vested in the FTC.
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